Insights/ Threat Landscape · Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 4 of 4
The roadmap: what your organisation should do now
A five-phase post-quantum transition framework: cryptographic inventory, prioritisation, vendor assessment, migration and governance, plus briefing the board.

The first three parts of this series established the threat, explained the mechanism, and described the standards that replace vulnerable algorithms. Part 4 is the operational article: what a security or risk leader should actually do, in what order, and how to make the case internally. The post-quantum transition isn't a single project with a defined end date. It's a sustained programme that, for most organisations, will run through the end of the decade. The organisations that complete it before the ASD's 2030 target are the ones beginning the inventory and governance work now.
Data sourcesASD Information Security Manual (2024) · NSA CNSA 2.0 (2022) · ASD, Planning for post-quantum cryptography (2025) · NIST SP 1800-38 (preliminary drafts) · NCSC PQC migration timelines (2025) · ENISA Post-Quantum Cryptography Report (2022) · APRA CPS 234Figures reflect publicly reported research as of October 2026. Findings evolve. Verify current studies before citing externally.
Phase 1You can't transition what you can't see
Build your cryptographic inventory
A complete cryptographic inventory identifies every system, application, protocol, and data store that uses cryptography. This is consistently the phase that surprises organisations most, in scope and in time required. Even with commercial discovery tooling, the inventory takes months for a mid-sized organisation, longer for large or complex ones.
NIST SP 1800-38, the NCCoE Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography practice guide (still in preliminary draft), includes practical guidance on discovery tooling and inventory methodology. Commercial vendors including IBM, Entrust, and Keyfactor offer discovery tools that automate portions of the inventory for network-visible assets. OT and IoT assets remain the hardest to reach.
Phase 2Not everything at once
Prioritise by data longevity and breach impact
Once you have an inventory, you'll have more transition work than can be done simultaneously. The prioritisation framework has two dimensions: how long the data needs to remain confidential, and what the impact is if it's compromised.
Data confidentiality beyond 10 years, or catastrophic breach impact
The harvest-now-decrypt-later threat applies most acutely here. Certificate authority infrastructure, health records, legal and contractual data, strategic IP, government reporting systems, critical infrastructure OT.
Moderately sensitive data with medium-term confidentiality needs
Transition timeline can follow Tier 1 completion, but planning should begin now, in parallel. Internal communications, HR systems, financial reporting, customer data subject to retention requirements.
Transient or low-sensitivity data, short natural refresh cycles
Incorporate post-quantum requirements into planned upgrades rather than separate transition projects. Web applications, short-lived session tokens, systems already scheduled for replacement.
Phase 3Your vendors carry your risk
Assess your vendors
Most enterprise cryptography is vendor-implemented. Vendor assessment should be built into procurement immediately, and existing relationships reviewed. Vendors without credible post-quantum roadmaps for Tier 1 systems are a supply chain risk. Document responses and act on gaps.
A credible answer names specific algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA), specific release timelines, and alignment with NIST FIPS 203/204/205. "We're monitoring developments" isn't acceptable for Tier 1 systems.
Every product managing certificates, signing code, establishing encrypted connections, or handling authentication is in scope. Vendors who can't enumerate this are themselves a risk.
The ability to change algorithms without replacing the entire product. Vendors building this in now are better positioned. Make it a procurement requirement for new systems from here on.
CNSA 2.0 applies to vendors selling into US National Security Systems, where new acquisitions should be compliant from 1 January 2027. A vendor's answer is a concrete signal of seriousness, and a useful benchmark even outside government procurement.
Phase 4Getting systems across
Begin migration on Tier 1 systems
With inventory complete and vendors assessed, Tier 1 migration can begin. The recommended approach is hybrid cryptography: post-quantum algorithms running alongside classical ones during the transition, giving immediate harvest-now-decrypt-later protection without requiring simultaneous decommissioning of classical infrastructure.
Phase 5Not a problem that stays solved
Govern and monitor, ongoing
Ongoing governance is required for structural reasons, not as compliance theatre. The threat landscape genuinely continues to evolve.
Algorithm evolution
NIST continues evaluating additional post-quantum algorithms. Future guidance may deprecate current standards. Build a process to monitor and respond.
Cryptanalytic developments
Post-quantum algorithms could be weakened by future research. Cryptography's history includes algorithms once considered sound. Monitoring academic research is essential.
Ongoing inventory
New systems deploy continuously. Procurement must incorporate post-quantum requirements so new systems don't reintroduce vulnerable cryptography.
BoardroomMaking the case internally
How to present post-quantum risk to a board or risk committee
The transition requires sustained investment and executive sponsorship. Three anchors make the case effectively.
Frame it as present risk, not future
Harvest-now-decrypt-later means the risk is active today. The board doesn't need to believe a CRQC exists in 2027 to understand data encrypted now may be readable in 2035.
Anchor to regulatory obligations
ASD's ISM sets the end of 2030, with milestones in 2026 and 2028; the UK NCSC asks for migration of priority systems by 2031 and completion by 2035. APRA's CPS 234 requires information security capability that keeps pace with changing threats. For listed companies, ASIC disclosure obligations are relevant.
Use the peer comparison
Major banks, government agencies, and critical infrastructure operators already have active programmes. The question isn't whether. It's whether to lead or lag.
Start hereIf you haven't begun
The minimum viable starting point: five actions, all available now
For organisations that haven't started, these actions have the highest impact per unit of effort and require no capital expenditure to begin.
Even an incomplete inventory is better than none. It surfaces the highest-priority systems quickly. Start with network-visible assets using available tooling.
Name a single individual accountable for post-quantum transition progress. Without a named owner, the programme won't move at the required pace.
Add post-quantum roadmap requirements to vendor templates immediately. Every new system acquired should have a credible plan as a condition.
Frame the risk, the obligations, and the programme of work using the three anchors above. Sustained investment requires sponsorship earned early.
The largest attack surface and the most accessible starting point. Assess certificate inventory, key types, and CA configuration against post-quantum readiness.
·Key takeaways
What to take into your next risk conversation
It takes longer than expected and surprises organisations on scope. An incomplete inventory started today beats a complete one started in 2027.
Tier 1 systems, long-term confidentiality or catastrophic breach, transition first. That risk exists today, regardless of when a CRQC arrives.
Vendors without credible roadmaps for Tier 1 systems are a supply chain risk. Make cryptographic agility a procurement requirement from now.
Harvest-now-decrypt-later, ASD obligations, and peer comparison are the three anchors. Sustained investment needs sponsorship earned through effective framing.


